










State	  Control	  over	  Interpretation	  of	  
Investment	  Treaties	  Investment treaties can give rise to significant 
liabilities for states 
Uncertainty regarding vaguely worded clauses in 
treaties can trigger costly litigation, and creates 
openings for tribunals to give unintended or 
incorrect interpretations to treaty provisions 
 Introduction 
This note provides an overview of the legal options and 
practical mechanisms for states to address concerns 
regarding their existing international investment 
agreements (IIAs).   
 
IIAs (which include bilateral investment treaties and free 
trade agreements with investment chapters) impose 
obligations on host states regarding their treatment of 
foreign investors, and typically provide foreign investors a 
right to enforce those obligations through investor-state 
arbitration. Some IIAs also require host countries to 
liberalize their markets and lock countries into those 
liberalization commitments. Through those obligations, 
IIAs can expose host countries to significant potential and 
actual liability, and can have profound impacts on the 
development and implementation of industrial and other 
public policies. Moreover, once IIAs are concluded, both 
their long lives and the power given to investment tribunals 
to interpret and apply them, make it difficult for state 
parties to those treaties to address unintended and 
unforeseen impacts. 
 
While states can take a fresh look at issues regarding the 
optimal design and impact of their IIAs when negotiating 
new treaties, they are more limited in terms of how they 
address issues that have arisen under existing treaties. 
Nevertheless, given the number of existing IIAs (over 
3,000 worldwide), the potentially broad obligations they  
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Interpretation is a relatively efficient tool to achieve 
the objectives of adding clarity to and reducing 
exposure under existing treaties; to increase its 
effectiveness, interpretation should be 
incorporated as part of government practice on an 
early and ongoing basis 
In order to reduce uncertainty, litigation costs, and 
potential liability, there are various strategies 
states can adopt for both their future and existing 
treaties 
For the 3000+ existing treaties, which typically 
have long lives and survival periods, options 
include termination, amendment, and interpretation 
Tribunals and counsel should ensure 
appropriate consideration is being given to 
states’ understanding of their treaties 
States have been increasingly active in 
establishing state agreement on key issues 
relevant to interpretation of investment treaties, but 
there is potential for them to take even greater 
control of their treaties through unilateral, bilateral, 
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impose, and their extended duration, it is crucial for states to examine those IIAs and take steps to 
clarify uncertainties and ambiguities so that the texts best reflect the signatory states’ intent. 
 
For existing treaties, states have three main options: (1) termination of the treaty, (2) negotiation 
of amendments to the treaty (or supplanting existing agreements with new ones), and (3) 
interpretations and clarifications of treaty provisions that must be taken into account by tribunals 
interpreting the treaties. While all three are important to consider as part of an overall strategy, this 
note focuses on the third option as it holds promise as an effective, yet relatively low-cost, avenue 
for avoiding unintended effects of treaty obligations.1  
 
States have significant – but as-yet relatively untapped – power over the interpretation and 
application of their investment treaties. By issuing joint interpretations with their other treaty 
parties, exchanging diplomatic notes, making unilateral declarations, and submitting briefs as non-
disputing parties or respondents, states can clarify uncertainties 
and ambiguities in treaty texts on a range of jurisdictional, 
procedural and substantive issues such as the meaning of the 
fair and equitable treatment obligation, the role of the most-
favored nation obligation, the significance of the “effective 
means” test, the scope of consent to arbitration, and a range of 
other issues. Under international law on interpretation of 
treaties, such acts, when evidencing subsequent practice and 
subsequent agreement, must be taken into account by tribunals 
in disputes arising under those agreements.  
 
But timing is important to the effectiveness and force of those 
interpretations; and the time is now ripe for states that have 
already concluded IIAs – particularly those with the short, vaguely 
worded provisions leaving much open to interpretation – to take steps to address the recognized 
problems by proactively managing their treaties. This note, drawing on the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, work by various academics, the International Law Commission, and 
UNCTAD, aims to aid those steps.  
 
Section 1 provides an overview of subsequent agreement and practice and its relevance to treaty 
interpretation; Section 2 then describes how subsequent agreement and practice have been 
applied and can apply in interpreting investment treaties; Section 3 addresses additional relevant 
issues that concern the use of subsequent agreement and practice regarding treaty interpretation; 
and Section 4 concludes by providing some practical suggestions for incorporating these ideas. 
The annexes illustrate how a patchwork of agreement among states on various treaty provisions 
already exists and can be expanded. 
“… subsequent 
agreements and 
subsequent practice … 
can provide an avenue 
for tribunals to engage 
in a dialogue with 
states and among each 
other with a view to 
better harmonize their 
own body of 
jurisprudence….”2 
  
     
State	  Control	  over	  Interpretation	  of	  Investment	  Treaties	  
  
3	  
1.  General rule of treaty interpretation (VCLT Article 31) and supplementary means of 
interpretation (VCLT Article 32) 
 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) provides the general rule 
on treaty interpretation.3 VCLT Article 31(3) states that treaty interpretation shall take into account 
“(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or 
the application of its provisions; [and] (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the 
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.”4 Subsequent 
agreement and subsequent practice establishing agreement (referred to simply as “subsequent 
practice”) are considered to be “objective evidence of the understanding of the parties as to the 
meaning of the treaty,” and are thus deemed “authentic means of interpretation” that must be 
applied in interpreting the relevant text.5 As the International Law Commission (ILC) has 
explained: 
 
By describing subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under article 31 (3) (a) and (b) as 
“authentic” means of interpretation [the ILC] recognizes that the common will of the parties, from 
which any treaty results, possesses a specific authority regarding the identification of the meaning 
of the treaty, even after the conclusion of the treaty. The Vienna Convention thereby accords the 
parties to a treaty a role which may be uncommon for the interpretation of legal instruments in 
some domestic legal systems.6 
 
1.1 Subsequent agreement (Art. 31) 
 
A “subsequent agreement” under VCLT Article 31(3)(a) is “an agreement between the parties, 
reached after the conclusion of a treaty, regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application 
of its provisions.”7 It need not satisfy any requirement of formality, but should constitute some form 
of “single common act by the parties by which they manifest their common understanding.”8 
 
1.2 Subsequent practice (Art. 31) 
 
“Subsequent practice” under VCLT Article 31(3)(b) may be defined as “conduct in the application 
of a treaty, after its conclusion, which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty.” While it carries the same force as a “subsequent agreement” under 
Article 31(3)(a), “subsequent conduct” under Article 31(3)(b) may be more difficult to establish 
since it is generally made up of conduct that can contribute to an agreement, but that is not 
embodied in one common and relatively clear act. Importantly, the “conduct” that can establish 
subsequent agreement consists of actions and omissions (including silence) attributable to a party 
to a treaty under international law; this can include conduct by state organs, high-ranking as well 
as local officials, and even non-state actors.9 
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For any conduct to fall under Article 31(3)(b), it must be conduct “in the application of the treaty.” 
As the ILC reports, this can be broad: 
 
[It] includes not only official acts at the international or at the internal level which serve to apply 
the treaty, including to respect or to ensure the fulfillment of treaty obligations, but also, inter 
alia, official statements regarding its interpretation, such as statements at a diplomatic 
conference, statements in the course of a legal dispute, or judgments of domestic courts; 
official communications to which the treaty gives rise; or the enactment of domestic legislation 
or the conclusion of international agreements for the purpose of implementing a treaty even 
before any specific act of application takes place at the internal or at the international level.10 
 
Similarly, and as is required for “subsequent agreement” under Article 31(3)(a), “subsequent 
practice” under Article 31(3)(b) must seek to clarify the meaning of the treaty or its application.  
 
1.3 Legal force of subsequent agreement and subsequent practice 
 
As noted above, Article 31(3) states that subsequent agreement and subsequent practice must be 
taken into account in treaty interpretation, along with other elements such as the ordinary meaning 
of the treaty’s terms and its object and character. The fact that it must be taken into account, 
however, does not mean that it is “necessarily conclusive, or legally binding. Thus, when the [ILC] 
characterized a ‘subsequent agreement’ as representing ‘an authentic interpretation’, it did not go 
quite as far as saying that such an interpretation is necessarily conclusive in the sense that it 
overrides all other means of interpretation.”11 
 
The ILC’s 2013 report, however, recognizes that the treaty parties can give their subsequent 
agreements binding force: 
 
[S]ubsequent agreements and subsequent practice establishing the agreement of the parties 
regarding the interpretation of a treaty must be conclusive regarding such interpretation when 
“the parties consider the interpretations to be binding upon them”.12 
 
The intent of the parties to give interpretations such binding effect is particularly clear when the 
treaty itself says that subsequent interpretive agreements entered into by the treaty parties will be 
binding upon them and/or those interpreting and applying the treaty.13 
 
1.4 Supplemental means of treaty interpretation and other forms of subsequent conduct 
(Art. 32) 
 
If interpretation of a treaty in accordance with Article 31 leaves its meaning “ambiguous or 
obscure,” or would lead to a result that is “manifestly absurd or unreasonable,” tribunals may turn 
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to “supplementary means” of interpretation in accordance with VCLT Article 32.14 Subsequent 
practice that does not “establish the agreement of the [treaty] parties” under Article 31 is one type 
of information that may be taken into account by tribunals to interpret a treaty in accordance with 
Article 32. Such non-Article 31 subsequent conduct can constitute a wide range of actions and 
omissions, including conduct by only one or some of the treaty parties; and even conduct by a 
state that is not specifically regarding the treaty’s interpretation.15 Much “subsequent practice” that 
has been considered by international courts and tribunals when interpreting treaties has been this 
broader form of conduct rather than the narrower category of specific actions or omissions 
meeting the criteria of Article 31(3).16 
 
The ILC instructs that treaty interpretation is to be conducted as a “single combined operation,” 
which places appropriate emphasis on the various mandatory means of interpretation under 
Article 31 (i.e., the ordinary meaning of the treaty’s terms, the context of the treaty, its object and 
purpose, relevant rules of international law and authentic interpretations by the parties) and 
permissive means under Article 32 (e.g., negotiating history and subsequent conduct).17   
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2. Subsequent agreement, subsequent practice, and investment treaties 
 
With the rise in investor-state arbitration, states have responded by clarifying their treaty 
obligations through interpretive statements added to existing treaties; refining language in new 
models and agreements providing “greater certainty” regarding the parties’ understandings of the 
treaties’ provisions; exchanging diplomatic notes; and making submissions to tribunals as 
respondent-states and non-disputing state treaty parties. As is discussed further below, such 
conduct can, in turn, evidence and constitute subsequent agreement and subsequent practice on 
treaty interpretation that, under the VCLT, must be taken into account by arbitral tribunals. Parties 
to investment treaties have also crafted new procedures and mechanisms to give them even 
greater control over interpretation and application of the texts. This section examines these 
practices.  
 
2.1 Joint Interpretations through a treaty mechanism 
 
Some investment treaties include provisions stating that the treaty parties can issue 
interpretations that will then be binding on investor-state tribunals. By stating in the treaty that the 
parties’ agreements are conclusive, the parties remove any doubt regarding their force, and also 
might be able to bypass procedural requirements imposed by domestic law that must otherwise be 
satisfied before states can enter into other binding international agreements like amendments or 
new treaties.   
 
An early and relatively well-known example of a binding-interpretation-provision in an investment 
treaty is in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The treaty established a Free 
Trade Commission (FTC) made up of cabinet-level representatives of the NAFTA parties or their 
designees;18 and Article 1131(2) states that any “interpretation by the [Free Trade Commission] 
shall be binding” on investor-state tribunals. 
 
Following NAFTA claims and decisions that triggered concerns by the NAFTA states regarding 
tribunals’ interpretations of the “fair and equitable treatment” (FET) requirement, the states used 
that FTC mechanism to issue the following interpretation: 
 
Minimum Standard of Treatment in Accordance with International Law 
 
Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of 
aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to investors of another Party. 
 
The concepts of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’ do not require 
treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary international law 
minimum standard of treatment of aliens. 
     




A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of the NAFTA, or of a 
separate international agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of Article 
1105(1).19 
 
Tribunals have accepted that interpretation as controlling – and narrowing – the meaning of the 
provision. This, in turn, seems to have benefitted the NAFTA states: UNCTAD’s statistics of 
investment treaty cases decided by October 2010 show that tribunals in NAFTA cases found in 
favor of investors on their FET claims 22 percent of the time (in 4 out of 18 cases where an FET 
breach was alleged). In contrast, in non-NAFTA cases where the investor alleged a breach of the 
FET obligation, tribunals found that the state violated the standard in 62 percent of the cases (41 
out of 66).20 Although there may be other reasons for these different success rates, it seems likely 
that the effort by the NAFTA parties to tighten up the standard has played a role. 
 
The NAFTA also provides that respondent states in an investor-state arbitration may request the 
FTC to issue an interpretation regarding whether an exception or reservation will apply. 
Interpretations issued on a timely basis by the FTC on the issue are binding on the tribunal.21 
 
The BIT between China and Canada similarly has provisions that expressly enable the state 
parties to issue binding interpretations, both general and in particular disputes. Article 18 states 
that the “Contracting Parties may take any action as they may jointly decide, including … issuing 
binding interpretations of [the] Agreement.” Article 20 then adds that if a respondent state in an 
investor-state arbitration invokes a specific exception to the treaty as a defense, the Contracting 
Parties are to consult each other in order to determine whether the defense is valid and any 
determination they reach on the issue will be binding on the tribunal.    
 
These types of treaty provisions, which are now present in a number of agreements,22 create 
special rules giving the parties’ subsequent agreement greater force than it might otherwise have 
under Article 31(3) of the VCLT. Nevertheless, as noted above, even in the absence of treaty 
language specifically stating that subsequent agreements are binding, at least some authority 
indicates that states could give those agreements conclusive force by indicating their intent to be 
bound. 
 
2.2. Subsequent agreement under VCLT art. 31(3)(a) 
 
States may establish their agreement on issues of treaty interpretation through a variety of means, 
including a joint written instrument, exchange of diplomatic notes, or an oral statement.  
 
The United States, for instance, has exchanged diplomatic notes with eight countries (Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Poland, and the Slovak Republic) 
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seeking to clarify specific aspects of the treaties it had concluded with those states. Each 
interpretation was designed to ensure that the bilateral investment treaties were deemed to be 
consistent with EU law and could be maintained in force when those eight countries joined the 
EU.23 The following exchanges of diplomatic notes between the United States and Lithuania 
illustrate the content of these subsequent agreements. The United States recorded its 
understanding in two separate notes – one for each topic. In the first, it stated: 
 
The Embassy [of the United States of America] confirms the understanding of the Government 
of the United States of America that Article IX, paragraph 1, of the Treaty [Between the 
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Lithuania 
for the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment] reserves the right of each 
Party to take measures that it considers necessary for the protection of its own essential 
security interests. 
 
The Embassy further confirms the understanding of the Government of the United States of 
America that, in the case of the Republic of Lithuania, these interests may include interests 
deriving from its membership in the European Union.  
 
The Ministry would be grateful if the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would confirm, by an affirmative 
Note in response, that these understandings are shared by the Government of the Republic of 
Lithuania.24 
 
In the other note, sent that same day, the Embassy wrote that it:  
 
confirms the understanding of the Government of the United States of America that the 
prohibition on performance requirements set forth in Article II, paragraph 6, of the Treaty does 
not extend to conditions for the receipt or continued receipt of an advantage, such as any 
advantage resulting from the establishment of a market organization for agricultural products 
and its market stabilizing effects.25 
 
It then requested that Lithuania’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs respond in writing to affirm that it 
shared the United States’ understanding.26 
 
The next day, Lithuania’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied with two separate written 
confirmations that it agreed with the United States on the interpretation of both the essential 
security exception and the restriction on performance requirements.27 
     




Argentina and Panama took similar action in 
order to establish their shared understanding of 
the most-favored nation provision, exchanging 
diplomatic notes with an “interpretative 
declaration” stating that the most-favored nation 
(MFN) clause in their treaty did not and never 
was intended by them to extend to dispute 
resolution clauses.28  
 
2.3 Forming subsequent practice through 
unilateral statements and actions – with a 
focus on submissions  
 
2.3.1 Unilateral conduct – examples from the 
investment treaty context 
 
Unilateral conduct may contribute to the 
formation of subsequent practice under VCLT 
Art. 31(3)(b) when it is explicitly agreed to or 
tacitly accepted by other treaty parties.30  
 
To date there are myriad examples of unilateral conduct in the investment treaty context. 
 
For instance, in response to the tribunal’s decision in SGS v. Pakistan reading the “umbrella 
clause” in the Switzerland-Pakistan BIT narrowly, the Swiss government sent a letter to the ICSID 
Deputy Secretary-General attaching a three-page reaction to the tribunal’s decision and 
interpretation of the provision. In the interpretation, Swiss officials stated that they were “alarmed” 
by the tribunal’s reading and considered it to be “counter” to the government’s intent and the intent 
of other states.31 
 
During the annulment proceedings in Siemens v. Argentina, the United States submitted a letter to 
the ad hoc annulment committee explaining its interpretation of several articles of the ICSID 
Convention.32 
 
The tribunal in National Grid v. Argentina discussed the role of unilateral conduct in establishing 
subsequent practice for the purpose of treaty interpretation. At issue in the case was whether the 
MFN provision in the bilateral investment treaty between Panama and the United Kingdom 
expanded to cover issues of dispute resolution. 
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In support of its argument that the MFN provision did not permit the investor to import more 
favorable dispute resolution provisions from other treaties, Argentina pointed to the interpretive 
agreement between it and Panama (referred to above) and argued that that understanding 
evidenced its state practice. The tribunal, however, concluded that the actions of Argentina and 
Panama may have been relevant as a subsidiary means of interpretation under Article 32 but, 
standing alone, did not establish subsequent agreement or practice for the purposes of the UK-
Argentina treaty.  
 
There were three key factors on which the tribunal based its conclusion. The first was that 
Argentina had apparently only adopted such an interpretation with Panama and not any of the 
approximately 50 other states with which it had investment treaties.33 The second was that the 
tribunal appeared to require state practice to establish the state parties’ intent at time of 
concluding the treaty.34 And the third was its view that the UK’s state practice signaled a different 
understanding. 
 
The first consideration is valid and provides an important practical lesson 
for states. Namely, if a state wishes to clarify certain articles or obligations 
of investment treaties that are common in more than one of the agreements 
to which it is party, it should (1) ideally seek to establish a clear agreement 
on interpretation with the other state party or parties and, (2) make broadly 
applicable unilateral statements similarly reflecting their understanding for 
treaties where that formal agreement has not been secured. A state can do 
this through such means as posting an interpretive declaration on its 
website along with its treaties.35 
 
Importantly, by making its positions known to its treaty parties through such 
overt acts and statements, a state will have a stronger argument that those 
other states – even if silent – agreed with its understanding. Establishing 
subsequent practice through action of one party and inaction by another will 
likely be much more difficult if the allegedly acquiescing party had no 
knowledge of its treaty counterparty’s conduct and views.36  
 
The second factor cited by the tribunal when discounting the significance of the Argentina-
Panama interpretation, in contrast, is questionable. Contrary to the tribunal’s assessment, 
subsequent agreement and subsequent practice need not establish that the parties’ had a shared 
view of the agreement at the time of concluding the treaty.37 The parties’ interpretations of the 
treaty provisions can shift over time, and subsequent practice can be used to establish a common 
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The third factor the tribunal relied on to support its finding that there was no subsequent practice 
within the meaning of VCLT Article 31(3)(b) was its view of the UK’s practice with respect to the 
MFN provision. It noted: 
 
Since 1991, the MFN clause in the UK model investment treaty has included a third paragraph 
stating that: “For the avoidance of doubt”, the MFN clause extends to Articles 1 to 11 of the 
treaty and, hence, to dispute resolution matters. The implication in the wording of this 
additional paragraph is that, all along, this was the UK’s understanding of the meaning of the 
MFN clause in previously concluded investment treaties. … [I]t is possible to conclude from the 
UK investment treaty practice contemporaneous with the conclusion of the Treaty that the UK 
understood the MFN clause to extend to dispute resolution…..39 
  
This aspect of the tribunal’s reasoning helps highlight another form of unilateral conduct that can 
potentially support subsequent practice under VCLT Article 31(3)(b): development of model texts. 
According to the tribunal, the generality of the language used in the model investment treaty and 
inclusion of the phrase “for the avoidance of doubt” served as 
important evidence of the UK’s understanding of the scope of 
the MFN provision in the treaties it had actually concluded.  
 
2.3.2 The role of respondent memorials and non-disputing 
party submissions 
 
 One extremely rich yet currently underexploited form of 
unilateral statements that can establish subsequent 
agreement and practice are submissions filed by states in 
investment disputes – whether acting as a respondent or 
as a non-disputing state party to the treaty.  
 
In investment treaty law, much of what we “know” and say   
about the law has been developed by tribunals through their 
decisions. States’ voices – whether contained in respondent 
briefs or submissions by non-disputing parties to the treaty – have, in contrast, commonly 
remained out of the public view or been relatively ignored. While awards are increasingly making it 
to the public domain, and are being cited as support in other decisions, submissions by states 
regarding their understanding of the meaning of their treaties have remained largely hidden, with 
only a relatively small number of pleadings by a handful of states being regularly made publicly 
available in disputes. What is known about states’ positions on the interpretation and application 
of their treaties is often limited to what can be gleaned from quoted or paraphrased excerpts from 
their oral and written contributions when those are referenced in awards.  
 
“[T]he boundary between 
interpretation and 
potentially impermissible 
modification is hazy; even 
if modification were 
considered a limit …, 
interpretation could 
support quite an 
expansive degree of 
change in and of itself.”40 
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The fact that awards are increasingly public but states’ submissions are not weakens states’ role 
in shaping the law, and leaves inaccessible a potentially important source of practice that would 
have to be taken into account by tribunals under the VCLT. But some states and tribunals have 
indeed recognized the important role of state submissions in guiding treaty interpretation. Parties 
to the NAFTA and Dominican Republic-Central America-United States FTA (CAFTA), in particular, 
have relatively well-developed and consistent practice of making submissions to tribunals on 
issues of treaty interpretation even in cases where they are not respondents.40  
 
The legal relevance of these submissions has been addressed in investor state disputes. In 
Canadian Cattlemen for Fair Trade v. United States, for instance, the tribunal affirmed that states’ 
statements and acts, including unilateral submissions as non-disputing state parties to 
investment tribunals, and submissions made as respondent states, can establish agreement 
under VCLT Article 31(3).41 Looking at the states’ statements and practices in the case before it, 
the tribunal determined that the NAFTA parties’ unilateral statements, respondent submissions, 
and non-disputing party submissions did not together constitute a “subsequent agreement” under 
VCLT Article 31(3)(a).42 The tribunal did find, however, that those unilateral acts and 
statements did constitute “subsequent practice” under Article 31(3)(b) sufficient to 
“establish[] the agreement of the parties regarding” the treaty’s application that it had to 
take into account.43  
 
Because there is no hierarchy among the sources that tribunals must take into account under 
VCLT Article 31(3), the fact that the states’ submissions did not qualify as subsequent agreement, 
but did count as subsequent practice, did not undermine their legal force. Although subsequent 
agreement is clearer on its face than subsequent practice both, when established, must be taken 
into account. 
Figure 1  
 
 
“In  the  context  of  ICSID  proceedings,  
Argentina  takes  the  position  that  a  
shareholder  cannot  bring  a  claim  in  respect  of  
harm  done  to  a  company  merely  because  the  
shareholder  has  been  prejudiced  through  a  
diminution  in  the  value  of  the  shares.”  Azurix  
Corp.  v.  Argentina,  ICSID  Case  No.  ARB/01/12,  
decision  on  annulment  (September  1,  2009),  
para.  86  (paraphrasing  Argentina’s  argument).	
“[A]  minority  non-­‐‑controlling  shareholder  
may  not  bring  a  claim  under  the  NAFTA  for  
loss  or  damage  incurred  directly  by  an  
enterprise.”  Gami  Investments  Inc.  v.  Mexico,  
UNICTRAL,  US  Article  1128  submission  by  a  
non-­‐‑disputing  state  party  (June  30,  2003),  para.  
20.  	
Establishing  Agreement:  
    shareholder  claims  
     





Notably, in agreeing with the respondent about the use of subsequent agreement and practice in 
treaty interpretation, the tribunal rejected the claimant’s contention that by allowing states this role, 
tribunals would enable them to improperly “taint” interpretation of the treaty and distort original 
intent through “revelation or revision by NAFTA Party officials subsequent to their learning that a 
NAFTA claim has been commenced.”44 
 
ADM v. Mexico represents another case where the tribunal relied on positions taken by NAFTA 
states in their submissions as respondents and non-disputing state parties in various NAFTA 
disputes, as well as in related domestic court proceedings, to establish the meaning of the treaty 
and conclude that, contrary to the claimants’ contention, the NAFTA only accorded procedural, 
and not substantive, rights to investors.45 
 
To illustrate the role and relevance of briefs in demonstrating state agreement on treaty standards, 
the figures above and the tables included in the annex below collect submissions by various 
states – some acting as a non-disputing party or as a respondent state – on the particularly 
contentious issue of the meaning of the fair and equitable treatment obligation. In Table 1 of the 
annex, each state contends that the obligation requires no more than the minimum standard of 





Argentina:  “Respondent  …  argues  
that  customary  international  law  
recognizes  neither  legitimate  
expectations  nor  legal  stability  as  
essential  elements  to  the  Fair  and  
Equitable  Treatment  standard.”	
Canada:  The  FET/MST  obligation  
“does  not  require  the  protection  of  
legitimate  expectations  or  
transparency.”    	
Guatemala:  The  State  does  not  accept  that  the  FET/MST  
obligation  includes  a  general  obligation  not  to  act  
arbitrarily  (para.  397),  to  act  transparently  (para.  409),  or  
to  protect  investors’  “legitimate  expectations”.	
El  Salvador:    "ʺ[T]he  requirement  to  provide  ‘Fair  and  Equitable  
Treatment’  under  CAFTA  Article  10.5  does  not  include  obligation  of  
transparency,  reasonableness,  refraining  from  mere  arbitrariness,  or  
not  frustrating  investors’  legitimate  expectations.”  	
Honduras:  :debido  a  que  el  enfoque  
debe  ser  en  la  conducta  del  Estado,  la  
Republica  de  Honduras  no  considera  
valido  ni  necesario  hacer  referencia  a  
las  expectativas  de  los  inversionistas  
para  decidir  si  se  ha  violado  el  nivel  
minimo  de  trato.”    	
United  States:  "ʺTo  suggest  …    that  
Article  1105  [FET/MST]  provides  a  
basis  for  an  investor  to  submit  a  claim  
under  Chapter  Eleven  for  mere  
frustration  of  a  legitimate  expectation  
is  nonsensical….  [S]uch  a  claim  lacks  
support  in  State  practice…."ʺ	
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entail a requirement to protect investors’ “legitimate expectations.” Although they contain just a 
small sampling of the information that can be gleaned from briefs, the annex and the figures 
provide a glimpse into how one can identify common positions reflecting agreement on various 
contentious treaty issues.  
 
Five factors are helping advance states’ use of briefs to give content to treaty standards and 
reduce uncertainty regarding how they will be interpreted and applied: (1) the growth in the 
number of treaties requiring pleadings to be made publicly available, (2) practices of states 
voluntarily disclosing their briefs, (3) explicit inclusion in treaties like the NAFTA and CAFTA of 
mechanisms for non-disputing state parties to make submissions to tribunals, (4) the 2013 
UNCITRAL arbitration rules requiring disclosure of pleadings and requiring tribunals to accept 
submissions by non-disputing state parties on issues of treaty interpretation 46 and (5) raised 
awareness and interest of states in asserting their roles as masters of their treaties.47 Through 
these practices, the skeletal but illustrative collection reproduced in the figures above and in the 
annex can grow into a more well-developed framework evidencing authentic interpretations of 
investment treaties to be considered by tribunals. 
 
As noted above, in addition to these relatively formal types of conduct such as submissions to 
tribunals and diplomatic exchanges, practice can also take other, less formal forms, such as 
statements posted on a government’s website along with its treaties, and less active forms, such 
as tacit acceptance of another treaty party’s position.48 In the context of the NAFTA, because of 
the numbers of disputes that have been brought against the United States, Canada, and Mexico 
under that single treaty, each state party has had roughly 50 distinct disputes giving rise to issues 
and questions for them to weigh in on with interpretations. In contrast, many other states and 
many other treaties have figured less prominently in investor-state arbitration, meaning that there 
are fewer opportunities to provide input. For these states and treaties, joint and unilateral action 
other than submissions in briefs will be particularly important for attempting to fine-tune treaties’ 
meaning. 
 
With respect to the issue of tacit acceptance, submissions by non-disputing state parties on 
certain issues commonly seek to prevent tribunals from drawing unintended inferences from 
silence of others. The submissions often state that they only aim to address discrete questions of 
interpretation, that silence on other issues should not be interpreted to have any meaning, and 
that the submitting party is not taking a position on how the relevant interpretation will apply in the 
relevant dispute based on the facts of the case.49 
 
Also relevant to the issue of silence, one notable development in investment treaties is for the 
parties to state what significance, if any, should be attributed to the non-disputing party’s failure to 
provide input in a dispute. The 2012 U.S. Model BIT illustrates this practice, stating that if a non-
disputing party does not provide an oral or written submission regarding the respondent state’s 
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attempt to invoke certain defenses, “the non-disputing Party shall be presumed, for the purposes 
of the arbitration, to take a position [on the applicability of the defense] not inconsistent with that of 
the respondent.” 50 
     
State	  Control	  over	  Interpretation	  of	  Investment	  Treaties	  
  
16	  
3. Other issues and considerations – timing, third-party rights, interpretation v. 
amendment, state-to-state arbitration, and unintended attribution 
 
3.1 The timing of the interpretation  
 
Actions taken during the course of a dispute to establish subsequent practice or agreement may, 
rightly or wrongly, be viewed as improper tactics to avoid liability rather than legitimate efforts to 
clarify vague standards. Indeed, the timing of interpretations has seemed to influence both the 
Pope & Talbot tribunal’s critical view of the FTC interpretation of NAFTA Article 1105, and the 
United States’ view of Ecuador’s efforts to secure common interpretation of the “effective means” 
provision (see below sections 3.3 and 3.5). Both the FTC’s interpretation and Ecuador’s attempt at 
a joint interpretation came after a tribunal had issued its decision on liability in favor of the 
claimants, and both were questioned as attempts to interfere with those awards.51 
 
To avoid these concerns, it would be ideal for states to take steps to clarify the meaning of their 
treaties on a prompt and ongoing basis, especially before disputes arise. Nevertheless, even 
submissions by respondent states in pending disputes do qualify as conduct that can establish 
subsequent agreement on interpretation; and submissions by non-disputing state parties can 
likewise be used to guide interpretation and application of the treaties in ongoing arbitrations. 
Indeed, as shown by the growing body of treaties expressly granting states the ability to make 
binding determinations, states have deemed it important to be able to control interpretation and 
application of their treaties by ensuring their ability to conclusively determine even investors’ 
pending claims.52  
 
3.2 Relevance of third-party rights 
 
As noted above, subsequent agreement and subsequent practice may not necessarily be binding, 
and, pursuant to Article 31 of the VCLT, tribunals must also take into account other means of 
interpretation including the object and purpose of the treaty. In this context, one relevant factor 
that might impact the weight a tribunal gives to subsequent agreement and practice is the effect it 
would have on non-parties to the treaty. Where interpretations solely impact the scope and nature 
of the parties to the treaty, tribunals may not be concerned about potential abuse. But where 
interpretations narrow rights or interests of non-parties to the treaties, as might be the case under 
human rights or investment treaties, tribunals might accord them less weight.53 The ILC, for 
instance, noted in a footnote that “[i]t had been asserted that the interpretation of treaties which 
establish rights for other states or actors is less susceptible to ‘authentic’ interpretation by their 
parties, for example in the context of investment treaties.”54 
 
Georg Nolte, the Special Rapporteur for the ILC’s work on “Subsequent agreements and 
subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties,” has addressed these issues. He 
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responded to concerns about the power of states to affect interpretation of their investment 
treaties by affirming the enduring value of subsequent agreement and subsequent practice:   
 
The comparatively limited use of subsequent agreements and subsequent practice by ICSID 
tribunals as means of treaty interpretation or modification has been criticized. The point has been 
made that the reluctance of the tribunals may be due to the consideration that a wider use of 
subsequent practice would give states an inappropriate possibility to retroactively affect and 
diminish the rights of private investors. This consideration would, however, underestimate the role 
of states as masters of the treaty and law-givers. The jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights indeed demonstrates that an international court can guarantee fundamental rights 
and at the same time amply take subsequent practice of the parties into account as a pragmatic 
orientation for where to draw the line between rights and possible limitations. In addition, taking 
subsequent agreements and subsequent practice more into account can provide an avenue for 
tribunals to engage in a dialogue with states and among each other with a view to better 
harmonize their own body of jurisprudence, and thus to compensate somewhat for the lack of a 
common appeals procedure.55 
 
There is thus nothing inherent in or about investment treaties’ investor protections that preclude 
states’ use of subsequent agreement and practice to shape treaty interpretation. Those sources 
remain valid and useful, though issues relating to timing of the clarification and the existence, 
nature and scope of impacted third-party rights might affect the weight a tribunal gives to evidence 
of subsequent agreement and practice in a particular dispute.56 
 
3.3 The line between interpretation and amendment 
 
The line between interpretation and amendment can be blurry and difficult to define.57 But 
international law appears not to give the distinction determinative weight, accepting as 
authoritative even those interpretations that are inconsistent with the plain text and original intent 
of the state parties to the treaty.58 Indeed, it is well-settled that the meaning of treaties may 
change over time as states’ understanding of the texts’ aims and effects evolves. Subsequent 
agreement and subsequent practice can be used to evidence and establish that evolution.59 
 
There are, however, arguments that interpretation and amendment are and should be considered 
distinct.60 
 
Some of those issues relating to the interpretation/amendment distinction arose in connection with 
the NAFTA states’ efforts to clarify the meaning of their investment treaties. In response to the 
FTC interpretation of the FET obligation, investor claimants argued that the FTC statement was an 
improper amendment, and not an interpretation binding on tribunals. The issue first arose in Pope 
& Talbot v. Canada,61 a case that was well underway when the NAFTA parties issued their FTC 
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interpretation. The Pope & Talbot tribunal considered the FTC statement to be an amendment to 
the treaty rather than an interpretation,62 but concluded that its findings of liability would stand 
irrespective of whether it applied the standard set forth in that statement or the one that it had 
applied.63  
 
In contrast, subsequent tribunals have been less concerned about the interpretation/amendment 
divide. For instance, the tribunal in ADF v. United States, a NAFTA case that had also been 
commenced when the FTC interpretation was issued, stated: 
 
[T]he Investor urges that the Tribunal, in the course of determining the governing law of a 
particular dispute, is authorized to determine whether an FTC interpretation is a “true 
interpretation” or an “amendment.” We observe in this connection that the FTC Interpretation of 31 
July 2001 expressly purports to be an interpretation of several NAFTA provisions … and not an 
“amendment,” or anything else…. Nothing in NAFTA suggests that a Chapter 11 tribunal may 
determine for itself whether a document submitted to it as an interpretation by the Parties acting 
through the FTC is in fact an “amendment” which presumably may be disregarded until ratified by 
all the Parties under their respective internal law. We do not find persuasive the Investor’s 
submission that a tribunal is impliedly authorized to do that as part of its duty to determine the 
governing law of a dispute…Such a theory … overlooks the systemic need not only for a 
mechanism for correcting what the Parties themselves become convinced are interpretative errors 
but also for consistency and continuity of interpretation, which multiple ad hoc arbitral tribunals are 
not well suited to achieve and maintain.64 
 
Because the NAFTA specifically states that treaty interpretations by the FTC are binding, tribunals 
handling claims under that treaty may be more willing to accept the controlling nature of FTC 
interpretations, and less willing to question whether they are amendments, than tribunals might be 
when the relevant treaty does not contain a similar mechanism.  
 
Yet even outside the context of the NAFTA and its provision regarding binding FTC 
interpretations, the distinction between interpretation and amendment in investment treaties may 
in many situations have limited practical impact due to the vague nature of many provisions in 
those agreements: when treaties set forth obligations as broad standards rather than specific 
rules, it is likely there will be more room (and need) for interpretations to provide guidance as to 
what those standards actually mean.66 As evidenced by the lengthy and costly litigation on the 
meaning of covered “investors” and “investments”, the FET obligation, the line between legitimate 
regulations and expropriations, the elements and scope of the non-discrimination obligations, and 
many other provisions, there is much room for clarification and correspondingly little danger that 
the clarification will depart from treaty text in such a way that it looks like an amendment.  
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3.4 Unintended attribution 
 
Because actions attributable to states under international law 
can constitute subsequent practice influencing treaty 
interpretation, it is important for states to ensure that their 
conduct conveys the right meaning. States that have 
adequate knowledge and resources to follow investment 
disputes arising under their treaties and participate in those 
disputes whether as respondents or non-disputing state 
parties, have a greater ability to manage their messages than 
states lacking such capacity. States that outsource and are 
not adequately involved in their defense or knowledgeable 
about relevant legal issues may unwittingly concede points or 
take stances not consistent with their actual understanding of their treaties. Even where briefs are 
drafted and submitted by private lawyers, states can be bound by their contents.  
 
Another issue regarding attribution relates to state-owned or –controlled enterprises acting as 
claimants. If a state-owned or –controlled entity of State A brings an investment treaty action as a 
claimant against respondent host State B, that entity’s arguments about the treaty’s provisions 
may be more investor-friendly than arguments made by State A when acting as a respondent 
state (or even as a non-disputing state party). Due to these issues, provisions in treaties, arbitral 
rules, and domestic law that require home states to be notified of disputes filed under their treaties 
and receive documents submitted to and issued by tribunals, and that also allow them to make 
submissions to tribunals, are especially important. 
 
3.5 State-to-state arbitration  
 
When one state seeks to clarify an issue of treaty interpretation, the other state may respond by 
agreeing, disagreeing, or remaining silent. The examples cited above have largely illustrated 
circumstances in which states have agreed – either through joint statements, exchanges of 
diplomatic notes, or unilateral submissions to tribunals taking common positions on questions of 
interpretation.  
 
But agreement may not always be so easy, particularly when the capital flows between the treaty 
parties are largely one-directional.67 The state that is predominantly the capital importing treaty 
party might face challenges getting the capital exporting treaty party to respond to, much less 
support, a request for an express statement setting forth the states’ shared understanding of a 
treaty provision, especially if that understanding were one designed to advance a narrow view of 
states’ obligations to foreign investors.68 
 
“The importance of such 
subsequent practice in 
the application of a 
treaty, as an element of 
interpretation, is 
obvious; for it 
constitutes objective 
evidence of the 
understanding of the 
parties as to the 
meaning of the treaty.”65  
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In these circumstances, as discussed above, a state may and should still take steps to make its 
own reading of the treaty known through such unilateral actions as postings on its website.  
 
It might also be able to initiate formal action under the investment treaty to compel state-to-state 
consultations on the issue, or have a tribunal decide the question of interpretation.  
 
Ecuador pursued the strategy of formal state-to-state dispute resolution after unsuccessfully 
seeking express agreement from the United States on a provision in the bilateral investment treaty 
between the two countries. Objecting to the interpretation a tribunal in an investor-state dispute 
had given to the “effective means” provision in the US-Ecuador BIT,69 Ecuador informed the 
United States of its view of the proper interpretation, and asked for confirmation that the United 
States shared Ecuador’s understanding.70 After the US declined to respond to Ecuador’s request, 
Ecuador initiated an arbitration against the United States under the investment treaty. The tribunal 
ultimately dismissed the action, finding that it did not have jurisdiction over the matter because 
there was no “dispute” between the United States and Ecuador.71 
 
That decision, however, has been criticized both by the dissenting member of the tribunal and by 
academics.72 Particularly in light of these critiques, it is uncertain whether future tribunals would 
take a similarly hands-off approach to cases in which one party to a BIT refuses to engage with 
the other state party’s efforts to resolve issues of treaty interpretation.  
 
A final note on the practical challenges that arise with different states having different stakes in 
clarifying their treaties is that the investment treaties themselves can potentially help address 
these issues. As noted above, treaties can state that silence in response to a respondent state’s 
position on some or all issues of interpretation in a dispute should be read as accepting (or not 
opposing) that interpretation. Many treaties also contain provisions stating that the parties must 
consult to resolve “issues” or “disputes” regarding treaty interpretation and/or application. States 
could potentially draft those “obligation to consult” articles more explicitly to ensure their requests 
for interpretations are answered.  
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4. Conclusions for practical steps and considerations  
 
The infamously vague language in existing investment treaties means that tribunals, investors, 
and states spend much time and resources trying to establish more precisely the implications of 
those agreements. States can help provide this clarity, and, in doing so, control the scope of their 
potential liability (and litigation costs) under their existing, long-lasting investment treaties. 
Whether inserted as an explanatory note appended to a treaty, developed in model agreements, 
asserted in non-disputing state party submissions, explained in respondents’ pleadings, or 
conveyed by other means, these statements and practices must be taken into account by 
tribunals.  
 
Even through the simple approach of making submissions to tribunals public as a matter of 
course, states help establish a “matching” mechanism enabling them to identify positions they 
share with other treaty parties. To date, however, states’ briefs have rarely been making it into the 
public domain, preventing them from playing the role they could play in shaping development of 
and promoting coherence in investment treaty law.  
 
In order to retain greater control over the interpretation of their treaty obligations, and in 
accordance with their rights under international law governing treaty interpretation, states can and 
should take a number of concrete steps: 
 
In their treaties, states can insert provisions  
• ensuring that their joint interpretations on some or all issues are binding on tribunals; 
• governing the meaning given to silence on certain matters; 
• encouraging (if not requiring) state parties to consult and cooperate to resolve ambiguities 
on questions of interpretation and/or application; 
• requiring that home states or other non-disputing state parties (1) are notified of claims filed 
under their treaties, (2) receive documents submitted to and issued by tribunals, and (3) 
can make submissions to tribunals on issues of treaty interpretation. 
 
In disputes, states can  
• remain informed on the interpretation and application of their treaties;  
• make their submissions public; 
• participate as non-disputing state parties in disputes arising under those agreements; and 
• make clear when they disagree with interpretations given by tribunals.  
 
Alone and with other countries, states can 
• make public their understanding of vague or uncertain treaty provisions through unilateral 
action (e.g., postings on a website listing their treaties);  
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• monitor statements and practice of their treaty parties to identify areas of agreement and 
disagreement; and 
• cooperate with other states to establish agreement clarifying ambiguous language, and 
clarify whether they intend those agreements to be binding. 
 
States’ counsel can and should also play an important role in helping their clients carefully 
manage interpretation of their treaties through subsequent agreement and subsequent practice, 
as opposed to simply addressing issues on a case-by-case basis as they arise through costly 
litigation of disputes. And finally, tribunals have a crucial responsibility to ensure that they properly 
apply rules of treaty interpretation and give adequate consideration to states’ understanding of 
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Table 1. Link with MST Asserted in Submissions 
Country Clarification of FET/MST Link 
Argentina According to reference to “‘Fair and Equitable Treatment according to the 
Principles of International Law’” is a reference to and coextensive with the 
“minimum standard of objective treatment” under “customary international law” 
and not an “autonomous and independent standard.” EDF International 
S.A., SAUR International S.A. and León Participaciones Argentinas S.A. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23, award (June 11, 2012), para. 
343 (noting the respondent’s position) 
 
(link not express in the treaty) 
Canada “[T]he Note of Interpretation rejects the interpretation of ‘fair and equitable 
treatment’ … as a standard of fairness autonomous of the customary international 
law minimum standard of treatment. It confirms that customary international law is 
the applicable source of law to determine the minimum standard of treatment 
under Article 1105(1), and that ‘Article 1105 requires no more, nor less, than the 
minimum standard of treatment demanded by customary international law.” V.G. 
Gallo v. Government of Canada, PCA Case No. 55798, respondent’s counter-
memorial (June 29, 2010), para. 262. 
 
(link not express in the treaty) 
Czech 
Republic 
Treaty reference to the “fair and equitable treatment” standard is a reference to 
the customary international law minimum standard of treatment. Saluka 
Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNICITRAL, partial award (March 17, 2006), 
para. 289 (noting the respondent’s position) 
 
(link not express in treaty) 
Ecuador “The fair and equitable treatment provision also does not create new, treaty-based 
standards, but merely incorporates or references the minimum standard of 
treatment under customary international law.” Chevron Corporation and Texaco 
Petroleum Corporation v. Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-
23, track 2 counter-memorial on the merits of the Republic of Ecuador (February 
18, 2013), para. 387. 
 
(link not express in treaty) 
El Salvador “The text of CAFTA makes it clear that ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ is a ‘floor’ or 
‘bottom’ to the acceptable treatment of foreign investments – treatment that does 
not fall below this minimum standard does not give rise to a treaty violation, even 
if such treatment may not be considered ideal by a party or a tribunal.” Railroad 
Development Corporation v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, 
submission by non-disputing state party, El Salvador (January 1, 2012), para. 3. 
 
(link express in the treaty) 
Guatemala “Article 10.5 of CAFTA limits the Parties’ fair and equitable treatment obligation to 
the minimum standard of treatment under customary international law. A claimant 
alleging a violation of the minimum standard of treatment under customary law 
bears two burdens: first, as examined in this section, it must prove as a matter of 
law that this particular standard of treatment is within the scope of the minimum 
standard of treatment under customary international law; second, … it must prove 
as a matter of fact that the respondent State violated that particular standard of 
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treatment.” Railroad Development Corporation v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/07/23, respondent’s counter-memorial on the merits (October 5, 
2010), para. 346. 
 
(link express in the treaty) 
Honduras “El trato justo y equitativo’ solamente se menciona con el rango de un ‘concepto’ 
que esta incluido en el_’Nivel Minimo de Trato.’ El segundo parrafo del [CAFTA] 
Articulo 10.5 establece claramente que este concepto de ‘trato justo y equitativo’ 
no puede ir mas alla del nivel minimo de trato a los extranjeros segun el derecho 
intemacional consuetudinario.” Railroad Development Corporation v. Republic 
of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, submission by non-disputing state 
party, Honduras (Jan. 1, 2012), para. 5. 
 
(link express in the treaty) 
Sri Lanka The “fair and equitable treatment” requirement is tied to the minimum standard of 
treatment under customary international law. Deutsche Bank AG  v. Sri Lanka, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/09/02, award (October 31, 2012), para. 414 (discussing the 
respondent’s position). 
(link not express in the treaty) 
United 
States 
Under the NAFTA, “ ‘[F]air and equitable treatment’ … do[es] not require 
treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary 
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.’” ADF Group Inc. v. 
United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1, US counter-memorial 
on competence & liability (November 29, 2001), p. 50. 
 
(link not express in the treaty) 
 
The provisions of the CAFTA-DR demonstrate the “Parties’ express intent to 
incorporate the minimum standard of treatment required by customary 
international law as the standard for treatment in CAFTA-DR Article 105. 
Furthermore, they express an intent to guide the interpretation of that Article by 
the Parties’ understanding of customary international law, i.e., the law that 
develops from the practices and opinio juris of States themselves, rather than by 
interpretations of similar but differently worded treaty provisions. The burden is on 
the claimant to establish the existence and applicability of a relevant obligation 
under customary international law that meets these requirements.” Railroad 
Development Corporation v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, 
submission by non-disputing state party, United States of America (January 31, 
2012), para. 3.  
 
(link express in the treaty) 
 
Table 2. State Submissions on Content of FET or FET/MST 
Country Stance (as disputing or non-disputing State party to the treaty) on FET 
and/or MST 
Argentina “Respondent … argues that customary international law recognizes neither 
legitimate expectations nor legal stability as essential elements to the Fair and 
Equitable Treatment standard. (See, Respondent‘s Rejoinder, at paras. 249-50, 
255). Respondent asserts that such broad interpretation extending to the 
protection of legitimate expectation constitutes a legislative expansion 
inconsistent with the contracting parties’ intentions as well as the principles of 
treaty interpretation under Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention.” EDF 
International S.A., SAUR International S.A. and Leon Participaciones 
Argentinas S.A. v. Argentina Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23, (June 11, 
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2012), para. 359 (paraphrasing respondent’s arguments) 
 
Canada The FET/MST obligation sets an “absolute minimum ‘floor below which treatment 
of foreign investors must not fall.” V.G. Gallo v. Government of Canada, 
respondent’s counter-memorial (June 29, 2010), para. 263.  
 
The FET/MST obligation “does not require the protection of legitimate 
expectations or transparency.” V.G. Gallo, respondent’s counter memorial, p. 95, 
heading D.1. 
 
Claimants have “submitted no evidence of practice of the three NAFTA Parties 
regarding the protection of legitimate expectations, let alone evidence of practice 
by any of the other 189 members of the United Nations, as would be necessary to 
prove that a rule of custom crystallized through widespread and consistent 
practice undertaken out of a sense of legal obligation.” Mobil Investments Canada 
Inc. and Murphy Oil Corporation v. Government of Canada, respondent’s reply 




The treaty’s FET obligation (which is not expressly linked to the MST in the treaty) 
requires an examination of the “governmental action in question was willfully 
wrong, actually malicious, or so far beyond the pale that it cannot be defended 
among reasonable members of the international community.” Saluka 
Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNICTRAL, partial award (Mach 17, 2006), 
para. 290. 
 
Guatemala The FET/MST obligation does not “ ‘create additional substantive rights.’ ” 
Railroad Development Corporation v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/23, respondent’s counter-memorial (October 5, 2010), para. 348 (internal 
citations omitted). 
 
The claimant has not established, and the State does not accept that the 
FET/MST obligation includes a general obligation not to act arbitrarily (para. 397), 
to act transparently (para. 409), or to protect investors’ “legitimate expectations” 
(paras. 424-428). Railroad Development Corporation, respondent’s counter-
memorial.  
 
El Salvador “The text of CAFTA makes it clear that ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ is a ‘floor’ or 
‘bottom’ to the acceptable treatment of foreign investments – treatment that does 
not fall below this minimum standard does not give rise to a treaty violation, even 
if such treatment may not be considered ideal by a party or a tribunal.” Railroad 
Development Corporation v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, 
submission by non-disputing state party, El Salvador (January 1, 2012), para. 3. 
 
The FET/MST obligation does not “ ‘create additional substantive rights.’ ”  
Railroad Development Corporation, submission by non-disputing state party, El 
Salvador, para. 3 (internal citations omitted). 
 
In El Salvador's view, to violate the minimum standard of treatment under 
customary international law included in CAFTA Article 10.5, a measure to be able 
to the State “must be sufficiently egregious and shocking – a gross denial of 
justice, manifest arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a complete lack of due process, 
evident discrimination, or a manifest lack of reasons – so as to fall below accepted 
international standards… Conversely, … the requirement to provide ‘Fair and 
Equitable Treatment’ under CAFTA Article 10.5 does not include obligation of 
transparency, reasonableness, refraining from mere arbitrariness, or not 
frustrating investors’ legitimate expectations.” Railroad Development Corporation, 
submission by non-disputing state party, El Salvador, paras. 6-7. 
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Honduras “Debido al origen de "Nivel Minimo de Trato" en el derecho internacional 
consuetudinario, como un "piso" absoluto que complementa la obligaci6n de los 
Estados de otorgar a los extranjeros al menos el mismo nivel de trato que los 
Estados otorgan a sus propios nacionales, solam.ente acciones de caracter 
chocante, excesivo, ultrajante, de parte de un Estado, pueden violar el nivel 
minimo de trato, incluyendo el trato justo y equitativo como un concepto incluido 
en el nivel minimo de trato.  
“La Republica de Honduras considera validos los siguientes ejemplos especificos 
de conducta que puede violar el nivel mfnimo de trato: una grave denegaci6n de 
justicia., tma arbitrariedad manifiesta, una injusticia flagrante, una completa falta 
de debido proceso, una discriminacion manifiesta, o la ausencia manifiesta de las 
razones para una decision.  Sin embargo, debido a que el enfoque debe ser en la 
conducta del Estado, la Republica de Honduras no considera valido ni necesario 
hacer referencia a las expectativas de los inversionistas para decidir si se ha 
violado el nivel minimo de trato.” Railroad Development Corporation v. Republic 
of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, submission by non-disputing state 
party, Honduras (January 1, 2012), paras. 9-10. 
 
Sri Lanka “The obligation of fair and equitable treatment is in Respondent’s view not 
breached where regulatory measures serve a legitimate purpose and are based 
on legal standards, rather than prejudice or personal preference. Even if, 
hypothetically, legislation were objectively imperfect, this does not violate fair and 
equitable treatment. A fortiori, imperfect implementation of existing regulation is 
no breach of the international standard.” Deutsche Bank AG v. Democratic 
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/2, award    (October 31, 
2012), para. 416 (paraphrasing the respondent’s position). 
United 
States 
“States may modify or amend their regulations to achieve legitimate public welfare 
objectives and will not incur liability under customary international law merely 
because such changes interfere with an investor's ‘expectations’ about the state 
of regulation in a particular sector. Regulatory action violates ‘fair and equitable 
treatment’ under the minimum standard of treatment where, for example, it 
amounts to a denial of justice, as that term is understood in customary 
international law, or manifest arbitrariness falling below the international minimum 
standard.” TECO Guatemala Holdings LLC v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/10/23, art. 10.20.2 submission of a non-disputing state party, United 
States of America (November 23, 2012), para. 6.  
 
“[A] claim under Article 1105 [FET/MST] would not be admissible if it were based 
only on an allegation of a breach of another provision of the NAFTA.” United 
Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNICTRAL, second 
article 1128 submission of the United States of America (May 13, 2002). 
 
“Sufficiently broad State practice and opinio juris thus far have coincided to 
establish minimum standards of State conduct in only a few areas, such as the 
requirements to provide compensation for expropriation; to provide full protection 
and security (or a minimum level of internal security and law); and to refrain from 
denials of justice. In the absence of an international law rule governing State 
conduct in a particular area, a State is free to conduct its affairs as it deems 
appropriate.” Apotex Holdings Inc. and Apotex Inc. v. United States of America, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, counter-memorial on merits and objections to 
jurisdiction of respondent United States of America (December 14, 2012), para. 
353.  
 
“To suggest …  that Article 1105 [FET/MST] provides a basis for an investor to 
submit a claim under Chapter Eleven for mere frustration of a legitimate 
     
State	  Control	  over	  Interpretation	  of	  Investment	  Treaties	  
  
30	  
expectation is nonsensical…. In addition to the fact that such a claim lacks 
support in State practice, the consequences of agreeing with Glamis that mere 
frustration of a foreign investor’s legitimate expectations rises to the level of a 
customary international law violation would be momentous…. In sum, the Tribunal 
should reject the notion that the customary international law minimum standard of 
treatment requires States to compensate foreign investors merely because their 
expectations have been frustrated. Glamis provides no evidence of such a rule of 
customary international law and, indeed, State practice refutes it.” Glamis Gold 
Ltd. v. United States of America, UNICTRAL, counter-memorial of respondent 
United States of America (September 19, 2006), pp. 180-84. 
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